Table of contents:
P.13. Evidence inferred from an utterance, a document, or a deed.
P.13.3. Evidence inferred from the perpetrators participation in drafting plans for displacement.
P.13.4. Evidence inferred from the perpetrator directly ordering or planning displacement.
P.14. Evidence inferred from a circumstance.
P.14.3. Evidence inferred from the perpetrators presence during the displacement.
P.14.4. Evidence inferred from the perpetrators awareness of territorial goals.
Element:
P.13. Evidence inferred from an utterance, a document, or a deed.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, paras. 339 340:
339. General Krstić attended two of the three meetings convened by General Mladic at the Hotel Fontana dealing with issues relating to the fate of the civilian population from Srebrenica. The first meeting he attended was held on 11 July 1995 at 2300 hours and the second on 12 July 1995 at 1000 hours.899 At these meetings General Krstić represented the Drina Corps and he sat next to General Mladic, although he did not speak.900
899. Krstić, T. 6208-6209, 6213-6214.
900. Mandzic, T. 974, 987-989, 1042; Witness B, T. 886, 925-926; P 40.
340. As a result of his attendance at these meetings, there can be no doubt that General Krstić knew about the refugees in Potocari and their desperate plight: that was a primary reason for convening the meeting and the subject of detailed discussion by the Dutch Bat Commander, Colonel Karremans. Mr. Mandzic, the unofficial Bosnian Muslim civilian representative, also spoke openly about the crisis conditions facing the refugees in Potocari, including the heat, overcrowding and lack of food and water.901 General Krstić was present when the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari was discussed and he heard the threatening language used by General Mladic. In particular, General Krstić was there when General Mladic bluntly stated to Mr. Mandzic bring people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction.902 It was apparently clear to General Krstić, as it was to the others present at the meetings, that staying in Srebrenica or Potocari would not be an option for the Bosnian Muslim civilians.903
901. P 40 (transcript of meeting).
902. P 40.
903. See the discussion supra para. 130.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, para. 359:
359. General Krstić displayed a similar concern during the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population from Zepa later that same month. In a conversation intercepted on 25 July 1995, the participants discussed an order, personally given by General Krstić, that the convoy bound for Kladanj was to be treated in a civilised fashion so that nothing of the kind of problem we had before happens.972 This indicates that General Krstić was anxious to ensure that the transport of the civilian population from Zepa was conducted properly, but it also suggests that he was fully aware that there had been problems with similar operations in the past.
972. D 167.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
P.13.3. Evidence inferred from the perpetrators participation in drafting plans for displacement.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, para. 335:
335. Despite efforts to distance himself from Krivaja 95, particularly the second phase involving the capture of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber is left without doubt that General Krstić was no ordinary participant in these events. Regardless of whether or not he was completely sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic, it is clear that General Krstić was fully informed of the conduct of the operation. Given his position as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and his prominent role in the drafting and execution of Krivaja 95, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krstić must have known the VRS military activities against Srebrenica were calculated to trigger a humanitarian crisis, eventually leading to the elimination of the enclave. He thus played a leading role in the events that forced the terrorised civilian population of Srebrenica to flee the town in fear of their lives and move toward Potocari, setting the stage for the crimes that followed. From his vantage point at the FCP in the hills of Pribicevac, he had an unobstructed view of the impact of the shelling upon the terrorised Bosnian Muslim residents of Srebrenica town.888 It is inconceivable that a commander so actively involved in the campaign would not have been aware of such an obvious cause and effect relationship between the shelling and the exodus of residents from Srebrenica that was apparent to virtually all UN military personnel in the area.889
888. Butler, T. 4187.
889. See the discussion supra paras. 122-125.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
P.13.4. Evidence inferred from the perpetrator directly ordering or planning displacement.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, para. 582:
582. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused was aware that his public statements and the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff on disarmament and on setting up the Agency substantially assisted in the commission of deportation and forcible transfer of non-Serbs. The crimes of deportation and forcible transfer were an integral part of the Strategic Plan, which the Accused espoused throughout in the awareness that it could only be implemented through force and fear, and the implementation of which he coordinated in his position as President of the ARK Crisis Staff.1485 He was also aware of the intent of the municipal authorities, the police and the army to deport and forcibly transfer the non-Serb population.
1485. See VI.D., The Role of the ARK Crisis Staff in the Implementation of the Strategic Plan, supra .
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, para. 608:
608. The evidence establishes that General Krstić, along with others, played a significant role in the organisation of the transportation of the civilians from Potocari. Specifically, the Trial Chamber has concluded that, on 12 July, General Krstić ordered the procurement of buses and their subsequent departure carrying the civilians from Potocari. At some later stage, he personally inquired about the number of buses already en route. The Trial Chamber has also found that General Krstić ordered the securing of the road from Luke to Kladanj up to the tunnel where the people on the buses were to disembark. It has further been established that General Krstić knew that this was a forcible, not a voluntary, transfer.1358
1358. Supra paras. 340, 344.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
P.14. Evidence inferred from a circumstance.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement (TC), 17 January 2005, para. 758:
758. The Trial Chamber further finds that Colonel Blagojevic knew of the assistance rendered by members of his brigade, and that the acts undertaken by them assisted in the commission of forcible transfer. As discussed above, Colonel Blagojevic, as a commander involved in the Krivaja 95 operation, knew the objective and result of that operation: the elimination of the Srebrenica enclave. This objective necessarily entailed removing the Bosnian Muslim population from that area. Over the course of 12-14 July, Colonel Blagojevic, through his presence at the IKM, in Srebrenica town and in Bratunac, would have seen for himself the manifestation of that objective as busload after busload of Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly travelled from Potocari to Kladanj through Bratunac, and then the temporary detention of the Bosnian Muslim men in Bratunac pending their transfer out of the area. He further knew of the role played by members of his brigade in this operation. Colonel Blagojevic knew that the forcible transfer was carried out on discriminatory grounds, as the objective of the forcible transfer was to remove the Bosnian Muslims from that part of Bosnia.
Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić and Vinko Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgement (TC), 31 March 2003, paras. 554, 566:
554. The Chamber is satisfied that Vinko Martinovic had command responsibility pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute. Members of his unit, including Ernest Takac and Dolma participated in the unlawful transfer and Vinko Martinovic knew about their behaviour and did nothing to prevent it, but rather participated in it. Vinko Martinovic is responsible under Article 7(3) of the Statute. The responsibility of Vinko Martinovic is most appropriately described under Article 7 (1) of the Statute.
566. The Chamber found that Vinko Martinovic and the Vinko Skrobo ATG participated in unlawful transfer on 29 September 1993. Mladen Naletilic was in command of this unit.1431 The Chamber is further satisfied that Mladen Naletilic knew or had reasons to know. Mladen Naletilic was put on notice by the regularity of such transfers, as discussed above, his deputy Ivan Anderbak was informed about this specific event and did nothing to prevent or to punish. The Chamber finds that such conduct was condoned by the leadership of KB. Mladen Naletilic is responsible under Article 7(3) of the Statute.
1431. See supra paras 91-94, 100.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, para. 335:
335. Despite efforts to distance himself from Krivaja 95, particularly the second phase involving the capture of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber is left without doubt that General Krstić was no ordinary participant in these events. Regardless of whether or not he was completely sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic, it is clear that General Krstić was fully informed of the conduct of the operation. Given his position as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and his prominent role in the drafting and execution of Krivaja 95, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krstić must have known the VRS military activities against Srebrenica were calculated to trigger a humanitarian crisis, eventually leading to the elimination of the enclave. He thus played a leading role in the events that forced the terrorised civilian population of Srebrenica to flee the town in fear of their lives and move toward Potocari, setting the stage for the crimes that followed. From his vantage point at the FCP in the hills of Pribicevac, he had an unobstructed view of the impact of the shelling upon the terrorised Bosnian Muslim residents of Srebrenica town.888 It is inconceivable that a commander so actively involved in the campaign would not have been aware of such an obvious cause and effect relationship between the shelling and the exodus of residents from Srebrenica that was apparent to virtually all UN military personnel in the area.889
888. Butler, T. 4187.
889. See the discussion supra paras. 122-125.
Prosecutor v. Duko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement (TC), 7 May 1997, para. 459:
459. The accused's presence at the Trnopolje camp when the surviving prisoners were deported to Croatia is significant evidence with regard to the charge in this subparagraph. The question remains, however, whether when the accused was participating in the seizure and selection of non-Serbs, as established above, he knew that the majority of the prisoners who survived would be deported. His presence at the Trnopolje camp when thousands of prisoners were being removed is relevant in this regard, as is his description of himself in his work report as an "earnest SDS member and an enthusiastic supporter of the idea of creating Republika Srpska", both of which embrace the notion of an ethnically pure Serbian territory. Additionally, in his role as SDS President in Kozarac, he must have had knowledge of the SDS programme, which included the vision of a Greater Serbia. Witnesses including Witness AA provided evidence which not only showed that the accused knew of this goal but that he was an active supporter of it. Witness AA testified to an argument about politics that the accused had with Sefik Sivac shortly before the conflict in which the accused said that the area would be a Greater Serbia, it would be theirs, and that we, Muslims, will not be there, that there will be no place for us there.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement (TC), 17 January 2005, para. 758:
758. The Trial Chamber further finds that Colonel Blagojevic knew of the assistance rendered by members of his brigade, and that the acts undertaken by them assisted in the commission of forcible transfer. As discussed above, Colonel Blagojevic, as a commander involved in the Krivaja 95 operation, knew the objective and result of that operation: the elimination of the Srebrenica enclave. This objective necessarily entailed removing the Bosnian Muslim population from that area. Over the course of 12-14 July, Colonel Blagojevic, through his presence at the IKM, in Srebrenica town and in Bratunac, would have seen for himself the manifestation of that objective as busload after busload of Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly travelled from Potocari to Kladanj through Bratunac, and then the temporary detention of the Bosnian Muslim men in Bratunac pending their transfer out of the area. He further knew of the role played by members of his brigade in this operation. Colonel Blagojevic knew that the forcible transfer was carried out on discriminatory grounds, as the objective of the forcible transfer was to remove the Bosnian Muslims from that part of Bosnia.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
P.14.3. Evidence inferred from the perpetrators presence during the displacement.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement (TC), 17 January 2005, para. 758:
758. The Trial Chamber further finds that Colonel Blagojevic knew of the assistance rendered by members of his brigade, and that the acts undertaken by them assisted in the commission of forcible transfer. As discussed above, Colonel Blagojevic, as a commander involved in the Krivaja 95 operation, knew the objective and result of that operation: the elimination of the Srebrenica enclave. This objective necessarily entailed removing the Bosnian Muslim population from that area. Over the course of 12-14 July, Colonel Blagojevic, through his presence at the IKM, in Srebrenica town and in Bratunac, would have seen for himself the manifestation of that objective as busload after busload of Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly travelled from Potocari to Kladanj through Bratunac, and then the temporary detention of the Bosnian Muslim men in Bratunac pending their transfer out of the area. He further knew of the role played by members of his brigade in this operation. Colonel Blagojevic knew that the forcible transfer was carried out on discriminatory grounds, as the objective of the forcible transfer was to remove the Bosnian Muslims from that part of Bosnia.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, paras. 335, 340, 354:
335. Despite efforts to distance himself from Krivaja 95, particularly the second phase involving the capture of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber is left without doubt that General Krstić was no ordinary participant in these events. Regardless of whether or not he was completely sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic, it is clear that General Krstić was fully informed of the conduct of the operation. Given his position as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and his prominent role in the drafting and execution of Krivaja 95, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krstić must have known the VRS military activities against Srebrenica were calculated to trigger a humanitarian crisis, eventually leading to the elimination of the enclave. He thus played a leading role in the events that forced the terrorised civilian population of Srebrenica to flee the town in fear of their lives and move toward Potocari, setting the stage for the crimes that followed. From his vantage point at the FCP in the hills of Pribicevac, he had an unobstructed view of the impact of the shelling upon the terrorised Bosnian Muslim residents of Srebrenica town.888 It is inconceivable that a commander so actively involved in the campaign would not have been aware of such an obvious cause and effect relationship between the shelling and the exodus of residents from Srebrenica that was apparent to virtually all UN military personnel in the area.889
888. Butler, T. 4187.
889. See the discussion supra paras. 122-125.
340. As a result of his attendance at these meetings, there can be no doubt that General Krstić knew about the refugees in Potocari and their desperate plight: that was a primary reason for convening the meeting and the subject of detailed discussion by the Dutch Bat Commander, Colonel Karremans. Mr. Mandzic, the unofficial Bosnian Muslim civilian representative, also spoke openly about the crisis conditions facing the refugees in Potocari, including the heat, overcrowding and lack of food and water.901 General Krstić was present when the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari was discussed and he heard the threatening language used by General Mladic. In particular, General Krstić was there when General Mladic bluntly stated to Mr. Mandzic bring people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction.902 It was apparently clear to General Krstić, as it was to the others present at the meetings, that staying in Srebrenica or Potocari would not be an option for the Bosnian Muslim civilians.903
901. P 40 (transcript of meeting).
902. P 40.
903. See the discussion supra para. 130.
354. The Trial Chamber finds that General Krstić was in Potocari for between an hour and two hours in the afternoon of 12 July 1995 and that he was present with other VRS officers, including General Mladic, overseeing the bussing of the Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly. The Trial Chamber rejects the evidence given by General Krstić that he was only present for a few minutes at the Potocari checkpoint and that he had no knowledge of anything that was occurring in Potocari involving the Srebrenica refugees. As a result of his presence in Potocari on the afternoon of 12 July 1995, General Krstić must have known of the appalling conditions facing the Bosnian Muslim refugees and the general mistreatment inflicted by VRS soldiers on that day.
Prosecutor v. Duko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement (TC), 7 May 1997, paras. 459, 461:
459. The accused's presence at the Trnopolje camp when the surviving prisoners were deported to Croatia is significant evidence with regard to the charge in this subparagraph. The question remains, however, whether when the accused was participating in the seizure and selection of non-Serbs, as established above, he knew that the majority of the prisoners who survived would be deported. His presence at the Trnopolje camp when thousands of prisoners were being removed is relevant in this regard, as is his description of himself in his work report as an "earnest SDS member and an enthusiastic supporter of the idea of creating Republika Srpska", both of which embrace the notion of an ethnically pure Serbian territory. Additionally, in his role as SDS President in Kozarac, he must have had knowledge of the SDS programme, which included the vision of a Greater Serbia. Witnesses including Witness AA provided evidence which not only showed that the accused knew of this goal but that he was an active supporter of it. Witness AA testified to an argument about politics that the accused had with Sefik Sivac shortly before the conflict in which the accused said that the area "would be a Greater Serbia, it would be theirs, and that we, Muslims, will not be there, that there will be no place for us there".
461. Based on the presence of the accused at the Trnopolje camp when surviving prisoners were being deported, as well as his support both for the concept and the creation of a Greater Serbia, necessarily entailing, as discussed in the preliminary findings, the deportation of non-Serbs from the designated territory and the establishment of the camps as a means towards this end, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the seizure, selection and transfer of non-Serbs to various camps and did so within the context of an armed conflict and that while doing so, he was aware that the majority of surviving prisoners would be deported from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
P.14.4. Evidence inferred from the perpetrators awareness of territorial goals.
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement (TC), 17 January 2005, para. 758:
758. The Trial Chamber further finds that Colonel Blagojevic knew of the assistance rendered by members of his brigade, and that the acts undertaken by them assisted in the commission of forcible transfer. As discussed above, Colonel Blagojevic, as a commander involved in the Krivaja 95 operation, knew the objective and result of that operation: the elimination of the Srebrenica enclave. This objective necessarily entailed removing the Bosnian Muslim population from that area. Over the course of 12-14 July, Colonel Blagojevic, through his presence at the IKM, in Srebrenica town and in Bratunac, would have seen for himself the manifestation of that objective as busload after busload of Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly travelled from Potocari to Kladanj through Bratunac, and then the temporary detention of the Bosnian Muslim men in Bratunac pending their transfer out of the area. He further knew of the role played by members of his brigade in this operation. Colonel Blagojevic knew that the forcible transfer was carried out on discriminatory grounds, as the objective of the forcible transfer was to remove the Bosnian Muslims from that part of Bosnia.
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, para. 582:
582. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused was aware that his public statements and the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff on disarmament and on setting up the Agency substantially assisted in the commission of deportation and forcible transfer of non-Serbs. The crimes of deportation and forcible transfer were an integral part of the Strategic Plan, which the Accused espoused throughout in the awareness that it could only be implemented through force and fear, and the implementation of which he coordinated in his position as President of the ARK Crisis Staff.1485 He was also aware of the intent of the municipal authorities, the police and the army to deport and forcibly transfer the non-Serb population.
1485. See VI.D., The Role of the ARK Crisis Staff in the Implementation of the Strategic Plan, supra.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
