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Table of contents:

3. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into the national armed forces or used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities.

3.1. The perpetrator conscripted one or more persons into the national armed forces; OR

P.1. Evidence of the perpetrator forcing by law one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces.

P.2. Evidence of the perpetrator forcing one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces using some form of coercion.

P.2.1. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces using physical violence or threats of physical violence.

P.2.2. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces by threatening to kill him/them.

P.2.3. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces by threatening reprisals on the person or their family or community.

P.2.4. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces using narcotics.

P.2.5. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed force using false promises.

P.2.6. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed force using false rumors.

P.2.7. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed force by way of abduction.

3.2. The perpetrator enlisted one or more persons into the national armed forces; OR

P.3. Evidence of the perpetrator accepting voluntary enlistment of one or more persons into the national armed forces.

P.4. Evidence of the perpetrator authorizing voluntary enlistment of one or more persons in the national armed forces.

P.5. Evidence of the perpetrator giving formal membership to one or more persons in the national armed forces through an administrative act.

P.5.1. Evidence of the administrative act of putting the name of the person or persons on a list.

3.3. The perpetrator used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities.

P.6. Evidence of the perpetrator’s use of one or more persons’ direct or active participation in combat.

P.6.1. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for activities on the frontline.

P.6.2. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for scouting.

P.6.3. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for spying.

P.6.4. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for sabotaging.

P.6.5. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as decoys.

P.6.6. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as couriers.

P.6.7. Evidence of the perpetrator placing one or more persons on checkpoints.

P.6.8. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons to kill the adversary.

P.6.9. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons to rape.

P.6.10. Not required: Evidence that force was used.

P.7. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons in a support function linked to combat.

P.7.1. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as a porter.

P.7.2. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for gathering and transmitting military information.

P.7.3. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons to provide supplies.

P.7.4. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as a sentry.

P.7.5. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as a cook.

Element:

3. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into the national armed forces or used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities.

"6J. S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary III Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (ICRC, Geneva, 1960), Arts. 4, 51."

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) para. 231:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) para. 229:

In Prosecutor v. Hinga Norman [Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Hinga Norman (SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E)), 31 May 2004], the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone held that the recruitment of child soldiers, namely the conscription, enlistment and use to participate actively in hostilities of children under fifteen, was a crime under customary law international law attracting individual criminal responsibility since at least November 1996. This represents the first time that the crime of child recruitment has been charged before an international court or tribunal. There is therefore no case law available on this crime at the moment. The ICC will benefit from the precedents that will be created at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and develop its own jurisprudence that will directly address the elements of this specific crime.

3.1. The perpetrator conscripted one or more persons into the national armed forces; OR

P.1. Evidence of the perpetrator forcing by law one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) para. 228:

"404 "To conscript" is defined as "to compel to military service by conscription, to enlist compulsorily", THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONNARY 848 (Vol. III, reprint 1978"), and as to "force someone by law to serve in one of the armed forces", THE CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 289 (1995)."

P.2. Evidence of the perpetrator forcing one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces using some form of coercion.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2001), p.205:

P.2.1. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces using physical violence or threats of physical violence.

UNICEF, Adult War, Child Soldiers: Voices of Children Involved in Armed Conflict in the East Asia and Pacific Region (2002), p. 24:

Mark Iacono, "The Child Soldiers of Sierra Leone: Are They Accountable for Their Actions in War?" 26 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 445, p. 448:

"[FN22]. See Schuler, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining how RUF rebels spare child’s life if child committed acts of violence). Rebels demanded an eight-year-old boy slit his father’s throat or face death along with his parents. Id. At his father’s request, the boy did as the rebels instructed. Id."

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

ICC, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda , ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on the Charges (PTC), 9 June 2014, para. 87:

"Children, including under the age of 15 years, were also abducted by UPC/FPLC soldiers from schools, streets or marketplaces. For example, in July or August 2002, witness P-0758, aged 13 at the time, was abducted by UPC/FPLC soldiers at a roadblock and taken to Lingo camp for training. She remained with the armed group until the arrival of the "Operation Artemis" contingent in July 2003. In August 2002, a boy aged 13 was recruited by force in or around Mudzipela by six UPC/FPLC soldiers and taken to Mandro training camp. On 8 November 2002, the UPC/FPLC entered the Ecole Primaire of Mudzipela and forcibly rounded up the entire fifth grade, approximately forty children, for military service. Further, on 15 February 2003, between fifty and sixty people, including children aged as young as 10, were taken by force from Ndrele market by UPC/FPLC soldiers, put in a truck, and sent to the training camp at Mont Awa. On 20 February 2003, a boy aged 12 was recruited in Mahagi-Port by a UPC/FPLC commander, while his mother resisted the recruitment. During the same month, a 14-year-old boy was recruited by force on the road to Mongbwalu market by Mr. Lubanga himself and six other soldiers, and sent to Mandro training camp."

P.2.2. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces by threatening to kill him/them.

UNICEF, Adult War, Child Soldiers: Voices of Children Involved in Armed Conflict in the East Asia and Pacific Region (2002), p. 24:

[B. Evidentiary comment:

P.2.3. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces by threatening reprisals on the person or their family or community.

UNICEF, Adult War, Child Soldiers: Voices of Children Involved in Armed Conflict in the East Asia and Pacific Region (2002), p. 24:

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.2.4. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed forces using narcotics.

"[FN22]. See Schuler, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining how RUF rebels spare child’s life if child committed acts of violence). Rebels demanded an eight-year-old boy slit his father’s throat or face death along with his parents. Id. At his father’s request, the boy did as the rebels instructed. Id.

[FN23]. See Schuler, supra note 3, at 1. (explaining commanders’ belief that children make good soldiers because of impressionability). Olara Otunnu, the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflicts, said that commanders desire children soldiers because rebels can easily "mold then into a ruthless, unquestioning instrument." Id. By getting a child to commit one horrid act, rebel leaders know such a child will obey subsequent orders. See id.

[FN24]. See Brutal Child Army Grows Up, BBC News, May 10, 2000 (calling drug abuse "key factor" in conduct of RUF), at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7436840.stm. (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). Evidencing the abuse, various reports stated thousands of syringes lay outside the abandoned home of RUF leader Sankoh. Id.

[FN25]. See Schuler, supra note 3, at 1 (detailing account of rebel whose leader cut his arm and inserted cocaine direct into bloodstream). One rebel stated the cocaine "gave [him] the will to fight". Id. With the drug-induced "hot temper", rebels raided towns and shot anything that moved. Id."

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.2.5. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed force using false promises.

P.2.6. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed force using false rumors.

P.2.7. Evidence of the perpetrator compelling one or more persons to serve in the national armed force by way of abduction.

The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, United Nations General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/306.Add.1, 6 September 1996, p.6:

"This form of press ganging, know in Ethiopia as "afesa", was prevalent there in the 1980’s, when armed militia, police or army cadres would roam the streets picking up anyone they encountered. […] In Myanmar, whole groups of children from 15 to 17 years old have been surrounded in their schools and forcibly conscripted".

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

3.2. The perpetrator enlisted one or more persons into the national armed forces; OR

P.3. Evidence of the perpetrator accepting voluntary enlistment of one or more persons into the national armed forces.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, para. 4557:

P.4. Evidence of the perpetrator authorizing voluntary enlistment of one or more persons in the national armed forces.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) para. 229:

P.5. Evidence of the perpetrator giving formal membership to one or more persons in the national armed forces through an administrative act.

P.5.1. Evidence of the administrative act of putting the name of the person or persons on a list.

Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (1999),, p.118:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) para. 228:

"404 […] "To enlist" means "to enrol on the ‘list’ of a military body; to engage a soldier", THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONNARY 191 (Vol. III, reprint 1978), and "to (cause to) join something, esp. the armed forces", THE CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONNARY 459 (1995)."

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

3.3. The perpetrator used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities.

NOTE: To "participate actively" and "to participate directly" are used interchangeably as the ICTR decided to treat them as synonymous in The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesyu, ICTR-96-T, para 629.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2005), p.378:

"7 ICTR Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Jean Pail Akayesu, ICTR-96-T, para 629 (emphasis added)."

P.6. Evidence of the perpetrator’s use of one or more persons’ direct or active participation in combat.

A. Evidentiary comment:

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, para. 1944 :

P.6.1. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for activities on the frontline.

Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONE 183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), p. 21:

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.6.2. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for scouting.

P.6.3. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for spying.

P.6.4. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for sabotaging.

P.6.5. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as decoys.

P.6.6. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as couriers.

P.6.7. Evidence of the perpetrator placing one or more persons on checkpoints.

Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONE 183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), p.21:

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, para. 4557:

"53 See, in particular, O.R. XV, pp. 65-69, CDDH/III/SR.45, paras. 11-31."

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.6.8. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons to kill the adversary.

P.6.9. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons to rape.

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.6.10. Not required: Evidence that force was used.

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) paras. 232-233:

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.7. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons in a support function linked to combat.

P.7.1. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as a porter.

The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, United Nations General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/306.Add.1, 6 September 1996, p.7:

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, para. 4557:

"53 See, in particular, O.R. XV, pp. 65-69, CDDH/III/SR.45, paras. 11-31."

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.7.2. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons for gathering and transmitting military information.

C. Pilloud and J. S. Pictet, ‘Art. 75’ in Commentary on the Additional Protocols, no. 3187:

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, para. 4557:

"53 See, in particular, O.R. XV, pp. 65-69, CDDH/III/SR.45, paras. 11-31."

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.7.3. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons to provide supplies.

Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONE 183/2/Add.1 (14 April 1998), p.21:

C. Pilloud and J. S. Pictet, ‘Art. 75’ in Commentary on the Additional Protocols, no. 3187:

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, para. 4557:

"53 See, in particular, O.R. XV, pp. 65-69, CDDH/III/SR.45, paras. 11-31."

[B. Evidentiary comment:]

P.7.4. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as a sentry.

P.7.5. Evidence of the perpetrator using one or more persons as a cook.

UNICEF, Adult War, Child Soldiers: Voices of Children Involved in Armed Conflict in the East Asia and Pacific Region (2002), p. 44:

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