4. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

4.1. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; OR

P.11. Evidence that the object of the attack was a vehicle of a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.12. Evidence that the object of the attack was a person involved in a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.12.1. Evidence that the object of the attack was a member of the administrative staff of a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.12.2. Evidence that the object of the attack was a coordinator in a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.12.3. Evidence that the object of the attack was a logistic expert in a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.12.4. Evidence that the object of the attack was a doctor in a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.12.5. Evidence that the object of the attack was a nurse in a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.12.6. Evidence that the object of the attack was a specialist in a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.12.7. Evidence that the object of the attack was a relief worker.

P.12.8. Evidence that the object of the attack was a person assisting refugees and internally displaced persons.

P.13. Evidence that the object of an attack were materials from a humanitarian assistance mission.

P.14. Evidence that the object of the attack were the premises of a humanitarian assistance mission.

4.2. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; AND

P.15. Evidence that the object of the attack were persons involved in peacekeeping.

P.16. Evidence that the object of the attack were the installations of a peacekeeping mission.

P.17. Evidence that the object of the attack were materials used by peacekeeping mission.

P.18. Evidence that the object of the attack was a vehicle used by a peacekeeping mission.

4.3. The object of the attack was not a military objective.

P.19. Evidence of the object lacking strategic importance.

P.20. Evidence of the absence of a military objective and/or activity in/at the object of the attack.

P.21. Evidence that the relevant military targets were located elsewhere than in/at the object of the attack.

4. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

4.1. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; OR

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, paras. 32, 34:

"32. (…)It is submitted that "humanitarian assistance"¹³ in or in connections with an armed conflict refers primarily to relief assistance, that is, assistance to prevent or alleviate human suffering of victims of armed conflicts and other individuals with immediate and basic needs. In particular, it includes relief actions with the purpose of ensuring the provision of supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population. Such supplies should at the very least include food, medical supplies, clothing and means of shelter¹⁴, and should necessarily also extend to the required means of transport."

"¹³See, for instance, P.J.I.M. de Warrt, Long-term aspects of humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts, in: F.Kalshoven (ed.), ASSISTING 71-74; F. Kalshoven, Assistance to victims of armed conflicts, in: id. (ed.), ASSISTING 19-24; P. Mascalister-Smith, Rights and duties of the agencies involved in providing humanitarian assistance and their personnel in armed conflict, in F. Kalshoven (ed.), ASSISTING 99; P. Mascalister-Smith, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: DISASTER RELIEF ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1985); Y. Beigbeder, THE ROLE OF AND STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEERS AND ORGANIZATIONS: THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 4-6 (1991); M.A. Meyer, Humanitarian action : A delicate balancing act, 260 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 485 (1987).

¹⁴See article 69 First Add. Prot. The US Congress defined permissible humanitarian assistance in legislation regarding support to the Nicaragua resistance as "the provision of food, clothing, medicine and other humanitarian assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapon systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict bodily harm or death", quoted in: the ICJ judgment in Nicaragua v. USA, supra note 12, 57, para. 97."

"34. ""Humanitarian assistance" covers assistance by non-governmental organizations and by inter-governmental organizations, as for instance the specialized agencies and programs of the United Nations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, or the World Food Programme."

There is no specific definition of a humanitarian assistance mission in the various treaties of international humanitarian law. According to Michael Cottier, "humanitarian assistance missions should (as far as possible) be guided by humanitarian needs of the suffering individuals¹⁶, and be of an impartial and non-discriminatory nature. Consequently, the receivers of the assistance should be selected on exclusively humanitarian grounds, and no party to the conflict or other group should be given undue advantage. Furthermore, "assistance" suggests that such missions may not use any force, except in strict self-defense. The humanitarian assistance should also receive the consent of the parties to the conflict the territory of which it must pass or in which it carries out its tasks." Moreover, as the assistance must be "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations", it is thus "submitted that so-called "humanitarian interventions" that use force and do not have the consent of all the parties to the conflicts are not "humanitarian assistance missions" in the meaning of this provision." However, in Nicaragua v. USA, Merits, Judgment, (1986) I.C.J. Rep. 124, para. 242, the ICJ has recognised that "the provision of strictly humanitarian assistance to persons or forces in another country, whatever [the] political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law". Article 70 paragraph of the First Additional Protocol further provides that offers of humanitarian, impartial and non-discriminatory relief "shall not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts". (Michael Cottier in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8, paras. 32-33). However, "while humanitarian assistance may in addition be offered by individual States, questions as to the humanitarian and impartial character of such missions are more likely to be raised." (Michael Cottier in Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8, para. 34).

"¹⁶The ICRC COMMENTARY, Article 9 of the First Geneva Convention 108-109, defines a humanitarian organization in that "it must be concerned with the condition of man considered solely as a human being without regard to the value which he represents as a military, political, professional or other unit", and that its humanitarian activities "must not be affected by any political or military consideration"."

D?rman refers to the first article of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel for guidance in defining protected personnel¹. However, he stresses that the definition relates to that particular Convention and the field of application is not necessarily identical to the crime defined under the Rome Statute. (D?rman, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute, p.156-157).

¹Article 1(…)

a) "United Nations personnel" means:

(i) Persons engaged or deployed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as members of the military, police or civilian components of a United Nations operation;

(ii) Other officials and experts on mission of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency who are present in an official capacity in the area where a United Nations operation is being conducted;

(b) "Associated personnel" means:

(i) Persons assigned by a Government or an intergovernmental organization with the agreement of the competent organ of the United Nations;

(ii) Persons engaged by the Secretary-General of the United Nations or by a specialized agency or by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(iii) Persons deployed by a humanitarian non-governmental organization or agency under an agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations or with a specialized agency or with the International Atomic Energy Agency, to carry out activities in support of the fulfilment of the mandate of a United Nations operation.

P.11. Evidence that the object of the attack was a vehicle of a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

"It is submitted that "humanitarian assistance"¹³ in or in connections with an armed conflict refers primarily to relief assistance, that is, assistance to prevent or alleviate human suffering of victims of armed conflicts and other individuals with immediate and basic needs. In particular, it includes relief actions with the purpose of ensuring the provision of supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population. Such supplies should at the very least include food, medical supplies, clothing and means of shelter¹⁴, and should necessarily also extend to the required means of transport."

"¹³See, for instance, P.J.I.M. de Warrt, Long-term aspects of humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts, in: F.Kalshoven (ed.), ASSISTING 71-74; F. Kalshoven, Assistance to victims of armed conflicts, in: id. (ed.), ASSISTING 19-24; P. Mascalister-Smith, Rights and duties of the agencies involved in providing humanitarian assistance and their personnel in armed conflict, in F. Kalshoven (ed.), ASSISTING 99; P. Mascalister-Smith, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: DISASTER RELIEF ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1985); Y. Beigbeder, THE ROLE OF AND STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEERS AND ORGANIZATIONS: THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 4-6 (1991); M.A. Meyer, Humanitarian action : A delicate balancing act, 260 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 485 (1987).

¹⁴See article 69 First Add. Prot. The US Congress defined permissible humanitarian assistance in legislation regarding support to the Nicaragua resistance as "the provision of food, clothing, medicine and other humanitarian assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapon systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict bodily harm or death", quoted in: the ICJ judgment in Nicaragua v. USA, supra note 12, 57, para. 97."

P.12. Evidence that the object of the attack was a person involved in a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

P.12.1. Evidence that the object of the attack was a member of the administrative staff of a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

P.12.2. Evidence that the object of the attack was a coordinator in a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

P.12.3. Evidence that the object of the attack was a logistic expert in a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

P.12.4. Evidence that the object of the attack was a doctor in a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

P.12.5. Evidence that the object of the attack was a nurse in a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

P.12.6. Evidence that the object of the attack was a specialist in a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

P.12.7. Evidence that the object of the attack was a relief worker.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

P.12.8. Evidence that the object of the attack was a person assisting refugees and internally displaced persons.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 32:

P.13. Evidence that the object of an attack were materials from a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

"337. In 1997 in a statement by its President following the military coup d’etat in Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council called for "an end to the looting of premises and equipment belonging to the United Nations and international agencies".³⁴⁰"

"³⁴⁰UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/29, 27 May 1997."

P.14. Evidence that the object of the attack were the premises of a humanitarian assistance mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 635:

"343. In a resolution adopted in 1999 on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned "acts of destruction and looting" of the property of those participating in humanitarian operations.³⁴⁷ The General Assembly urged all states "to take the necessary measures … to respect and ensure respect for the inviolability of United Nations premises".³⁴⁸"

"³⁴⁷ UN General Assembly, Res. 54/192, 17 December 1999, preamble.

³⁴⁸ UN General Assembly, Res. 55/92, 17 December 1999, §2."

4.2. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; AND

Michael Cottier, "Article 8" in Otto Triffterer, ed, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) article 8, para. 39:

"39. Even though peacekeeping missions established or authorized by the UN²¹ are not mentioned in the UN Charter, it is not contested that their establishment is lawful and fully respects the Charter²². (…) Also, regional organizations such as the OSCE²³, EU²⁴ or ECOWAS have been establishing or authorizing peacekeeping and observer missions²⁵".

"²¹UN missions were the sole object of negotiations up to the end of the Diplomatic Conference.

²²Secretary-General Hammarskjold invented the term "Chapter VI-and-a-half operations" to indicate this fact that peacekeeping operations have not precise foundation in the Chapter."

²³See M. Bother et al. (eds.), THE OSCE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY (1997).

²⁴The Common foreign and security policy includes "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking", article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty.

²⁵The UN Security Council has repeatedly condemned armed attacks against peacekeeping forces set up by regional organizations (S.C. Res. 788 (1992), para. 4, and S.C. Res. 813 (1993), para. 6, on ECOWAS peace-keeping forces in Liberia) and asked the parties to the conflict to ensure their safety (S.C. Res. 993 (1995), preamble , and S.C. Res. 1036 (1996), para. 8, on CIS peace-keeping forces). On peacekeeping of regional organizations see, e.g., I.J. Rikhye, THE THEORY and PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING 131 (1984)."

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 649:

"57.In a resolution adopted in 1994 in the context of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN Security Council condemned "the harassment and the detention of UNPROFOR personnel by the Bosnian Serb forces and all obstacles to UNPROFOR’s freedom of movement".^52"

"⁵² UN Security Council, Res. 913, 22 April 1994, Preamble."

P.15. Evidence that the object of the attack were persons involved in peacekeeping.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 649:

"55.In a resolution on Somalia adopted in 1994, the UN Security Council condemned "violence and armed attacks against persons engaged in … peace-keeping efforts" and re-emphasised the importance it attached to "the safety and security of United Nations and other personnel engaged in … peacekeeping throughout Somalia⁴⁸".

"⁴⁸UN Security Council, Res. 897, 4 February 1994, Preamble."

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 653:

"85. In 1994, in a statement by its President, concerning the situation in Rwanda, the UN Security Council condemned the killing of at least 10 Belgian peacekeepers, as well as the reported kidnapping of others as "horrific attacks" and urged "respect for the safety and security of … UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel"⁸³".

"⁸³UN Security Council, Statement by the President, UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/16, 7 April 1994, p.1."

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 649:

"57.In a resolution adopted in 1994 in the context of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN Security Council condemned "the harassment and the detention of UNPROFOR personnel by the Bosnian Serb forces and all obstacles to UNPROFOR’s freedom of movement".^52"

"⁵² UN Security Council, Res. 913, 22 April 1994, Preamble."

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 652:

"74. In a resolution on Angola adopted in 1997, the UN Security Council expressed "its concern about the … attacks by UNITA on UNAVEM III posts and personnel".⁷¹"

"⁷¹ UN Security Council, Res. 1099, 14 March 1997, preamble and § 4."

P.16. Evidence that the object of the attack were the installations of a peacekeeping mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 652:

"74. In a resolution on Angola adopted in 1997, the UN Security Council expressed "its concern about the … attacks by UNITA on UNAVEM III posts and personnel".⁷¹"

"⁷¹ UN Security Council, Res. 1099, 14 March 1997, preamble and § 4."

P.17. Evidence that the object of the attack were materials used by peacekeeping mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 649-50:

"61. In a resolution on Liberia adopted in 1994, the UN Security Council condemned "the detention and maltreatment of UNOMIL observers [and] ECOMOG soldiers" and demanded that "all factions in Liberia strictly respect the status of ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel, and… refrain from any acts of violence, abuse or intimidation against them and return forthwith equipment seized from them".⁵⁷"

"⁵⁷ UN Security Council, Res. 950, 21 October 1994, §7 and 8."

P.18. Evidence that the object of the attack was a vehicle used by a peacekeeping mission.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

ICRC, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law, Volume II: Practice, Part I (2005), p. 650:

"108. In 1992, in a report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 783 (1992), the UN Secretary-General characterized as "disturbing development" the increase attacks on UNTAC personnel and helicopters in Cambodia¹⁰⁷".

"¹⁰⁷UN Secretary-General, Report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 783 (1992), UN Doc. S/24800, 15 November 1992, §15)."

Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/79, 13 December 1994:

"The Security Council strongly condemns the deliberate attack on Bangladeshi United Nations peace-keepers on 12 December 1994 in Velika Kladusa, in the region of Bihac in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The attacked personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) were travelling in an armoured personnel carrier, unmistakably carrying clear United Nations markings. It was hit by a wire-guided anti-tank missile resulting in one death and injuries to four other Bangladeshi personnel."

4.3. The object of the attack was not a military objective.

Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement (TC), 26 February 2001 para. 53:

"53. Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I prohibits explicitly attacks or reprisals on civilian objects. It defines civilian objects as "all objects which are not military objectives". Further, Article 52(1) defines military objectives as "limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage". (…) The Appeals Chamber notes that the imperative "in case of doubt" is limited to the expected conduct of a member of the military. However, when the latter’s criminal responsibility is at issue, the burden of proof as to whether an object is a civilian one rests on the Prosecution."

Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT- 95-16-T, Judgement (TC), 14 January 2000, para. 523:

"523. In the case of clear abuse of their rights by civilians, international rules operate to lift that protection which would otherwise be owed to them. Thus, for instance, under Article 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the special protection against attacks granted to civilian hospitals shall cease, subject to certain conditions , if the hospital "(is used) to commit, outside (its) humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy", for example if an artillery post is set up on top of the hospital."

The central concept of international humanitarian law is the distinction between civilian and military objectives. Unless a civilian object is used so as to become an effective contribution to military action or a civilian person becomes a combatant, this object or person cannot be the object of an attack. This also applies to the humanitarian and peacekeeping objects and personnel who are considered civilians. Since no jurisprudence on this is to be found, the case law from articles 8 (2)(b)(i) and (ii) that is equally applicable to article 8 (2)(b)(iii) is included in the following.

P.19. Evidence of the object lacking strategic importance.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, para. 411:

"411. Although the village of Ahmici had no strategic importance which justified the fighting, it was however of particular significance for the Muslim community in Bosnia. […]"

P.20. Evidence of the absence of a military objective and/or activity in/at the object of the attack.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement (TC), 31 January 2005, paras. 184, 288:

"⁵⁹⁷. Lars Brolund, T 874; Per Hvalkof, T 2218-2219."

"288. The Chamber has found that the Old Town was extensively targeted by JNA artillery and other weapons on 6 December 1991⁹²⁸ and that no military firing points or other objectives, real or believed, in the Old Town were targeted by the JNA.⁹²⁹ Hence, in the Chamber’s finding, the intent of the perpetrators was to target civilians and civilian objects in the Old Town. […]"

"⁹²⁸. See supra, para 214.

⁹²⁹. See supra, paras 193-194."

Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement (TC), 5 December 2003, para. 508:

"508. The witnesses indicated further that, despite occasional outgoing ABiH fire from hospital ground, the SRK attacks were in fact directed at the hospital and served no military purpose. As result of the incident reported to Cutler, Harding re-visited the Kosevo hospital in January 1993 to assess whether it was being shelled as result of SRK counter-battery fire, or deliberately targeted.¹⁷⁴⁰ He could not find any of the distinctive traces usually left by mortars.¹⁷⁴¹ On the basis of his observations at the Hospital, Harding concluded that:

[i]f there was offensive action taken as a direct result of those mortars, it can be referred to as counter battery fire. However, when I went to the hospital, there was fresh damage as it was only a week or two after I conducted a battle damage assessment. And had the hospital been damaged by a 76 millimetre anti-tank rounds or armour-piercing rounds, and some of these rounds were presented to me, these rounds had hit the building very high up. So even if they had been fired whilst the mortar was firing, they would have been completely ineffective. Six or seven rounds had hit the hospital, and obviously they had been fired by a weapon aimed at the hospital rather than at any mortars that may or may not have been there. So the hospital had been attacked, and it was not a suitable weapon to use as counter battery fire […] By high up, I mean that if it was counter battery fire, it would be aimed at something on the ground, but it obviously wasn't because it was on the first or second storey of the building. So if it had been fired at the same time as the mortars were firing, there was no way at all that it would ever have hit the mortars because it was just fired at the building. The building was the target, not any mortars.¹⁷⁴²"

"¹⁷⁴⁰. Mole, T. 11140; Harding, T. 4371-2.

¹⁷⁴¹. Harding, T. 4371-3.

¹⁷⁴². Harding, T. 4372."

P.21. Evidence that the relevant military targets were located elsewhere than in/at the object of the attack.

A. Legal source/authority and evidence:

Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgement (TC), 31 January 2005, para. 203:

"203. The firing positions described in the preceding paragraphs are located various distances from the Old Town. All are outside the Old Town. Some of them are so remote from the Old Town that any attempt to neutralise them by the JNA forces, even using the most imprecise weapons, could not affect the Old Town. As regards the positions which are closer to the Old Town, the Chamber heard expert evidence as to which positions in the vicinity of the Old Town, if targeted by the JNA, would give rise to a risk of incidental shelling of the Old Town."