Table of contents:
P.16. Evidence inferred from an utterance, a document, or a deed of the perpetrator.
P.16.4. Evidence inferred from the perpetrator ordering or planning forcible transfer.
P.16.5. Evidence inferred from calling out residents names for future transfer.
P.17. Exculpatory: Evidence of temporary transfer for medical or safetly reasons.
Element:
P.16. Evidence inferred from an utterance, a document, or a deed of the perpetrator.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, paras. 339 340:
"339. General Krstić attended two of the three meetings convened by General Mladic at the Hotel Fontana dealing with issues relating to the fate of the civilian population from Srebrenica. The first meeting he attended was held on 11 July 1995 at 2300 hours and the second on 12 July 1995 at 1000 hours. At these meetings General Krstić represented the Drina Corps and he sat next to General Mladic, although he did not speak."
340. As a result of his attendance at these meetings, there can be no doubt that General Krstić knew about the refugees in Potocari and their desperate plight: that was a primary reason for convening the meeting and the subject of detailed discussion by the Dutch Bat Commander, Colonel Karremans. Mr. Mandzic, the unofficial Bosnian Muslim civilian representative, also spoke openly about the crisis conditions facing the refugees in Potocari, including the heat, overcrowding and lack of food and water. General Krstić was present when the transportation of the Bosnian Muslim civilians out of Potocari was discussed and he heard the threatening language used by General Mladic. In particular, General Krstić was there when General Mladic bluntly stated to Mr. Mandzic bring people who can secure the surrender of weapons and save your people from destruction. It was apparently clear to General Krstić, as it was to the others present at the meetings, that staying in Srebrenica or Potocari would not be an option for the Bosnian Muslim civilians."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, para. 359:
"359. General Krstić displayed a similar concern during the removal of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population from Zepa later that same month. In a conversation intercepted on 25 July 1995, the participants discussed an order, personally given by General Krstić, that the convoy bound for Kladanj was to be treated in a civilised fashion "so that nothing of the kind of problem we had before happens."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement (TC), 2 August 2001, para. 335:
"335. Despite efforts to distance himself from Krivaja 95, particularly the second phase involving the capture of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber is left without doubt that General Krstić was no ordinary participant in these events. Regardless of whether or not he was completely sidelined upon the arrival of General Mladic, it is clear that General Krstić was fully informed of the conduct of the operation. Given his position as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and his prominent role in the drafting and execution of Krivaja 95, the Trial Chamber finds that General Krstić must have known the VRS military activities against Srebrenica were calculated to trigger a humanitarian crisis, eventually leading to the elimination of the enclave. He thus played a leading role in the events that forced the terrorised civilian population of Srebrenica to flee the town in fear of their lives and move toward Potocari, setting the stage for the crimes that followed. From his vantage point at the FCP in the hills of Pribicevac, he had an unobstructed view of the impact of the shelling upon the terrorised Bosnian Muslim residents of Srebrenica town. It is inconceivable that a commander so actively involved in the campaign would not have been aware of such an obvious cause and effect relationship between the shelling and the exodus of residents from Srebrenica that was apparent to virtually all UN military personnel in the area."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
P.16.4. Evidence inferred from the perpetrator ordering or planning forcible transfer.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, para. 582:
"582. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused was aware that his public statements and the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff on disarmament and on setting up the Agency substantially assisted in the commission of deportation and forcible transfer of non-Serbs. The crimes of deportation and forcible transfer were an integral part of the Strategic Plan, which the Accused espoused throughout in the awareness that it could only be implemented through force and fear, and the implementation of which he coordinated in his position as President of the ARK Crisis Staff. He was also aware of the intent of the municipal authorities, the police and the army to deport and forcibly transfer the non-Serb population."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
P.16.5. Evidence inferred from calling out residents names for future transfer.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Duko Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement (TC), 7 May 1997,para. 387:
"387. The Trial Chamber has found beyond reasonable doubt that the accused entered the villages of Sivci and Jaskici together with other armed men as charged in paragraph 12. In Sivci, the accused took part in the removal of the men from that village, who had been separated from the women and children, to the Keraterm camp and, in Jaskici, took part in the calling-out of residents, the separation of men from women and children and the beating and removal of the men."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement (TC), 17 January 2005, para. 758:
"758. The Trial Chamber further finds that Colonel Blagojević knew of the assistance rendered by members of his brigade, and that the acts undertaken by them assisted in the commission of forcible transfer. As discussed above, Colonel Blagojević, as a commander involved in the Krivaja 95 operation, knew the objective and result of that operation: the elimination of the Srebrenica enclave. This objective necessarily entailed removing the Bosnian Muslim population from that area. Over the course of 12-14 July, Colonel Blagojević, through his presence at the IKM, in Srebrenica town and in Bratunac, would have seen for himself the manifestation of that objective as busload after busload of Bosnian Muslim women, children and elderly travelled from Potocari to Kladanj through Bratunac, and then the temporary detention of the Bosnian Muslim men in Bratunac pending their transfer out of the area. He further knew of the role played by members of his brigade in this operation. Colonel Blagojević knew that the forcible transfer was carried out on discriminatory grounds, as the objective of the forcible transfer was to remove the Bosnian Muslims from that part of Bosnia."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
P.17. Exculpatory: Evidence of temporary transfer for medical or safetly reasons.
A. Evidentiary comment:
Art. 78 AP I provides that no party shall arrange for the evacuation of children, other than its own nationals, to foreign country except for a temporary evacuation where compelling reasons of health or medical treatment of the children or, except in occupied territory, their safety so require.
