Element:
ICTY
In Renzaho, the Trial Chamber cited the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac et al. in holding that:
"[t]he mens rea of the crime requires that the Accused knew that his act or omission would have such effect."[1]
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski stated:
"there is no additional requirement to establish that the Accused had a discriminatory intent or motive."[2]
Both the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber in Kunarac et al. were also cited by the Trial Chamber in Sesay et al. when it recognized that:
"the mens rea of the offence does not require that the Accused had a specific intent to humiliate or degrade the victims, that is, that he perpetrated the act for that very reason. The act or omission must, however, have been done intentionally and the Accused must have known "that his act or omission could cause serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity." The Chamber considers that there is no requirement to establish that the Accused knew of the "actual consequences of the act", but only of its possible consequences."[3]
Footnotes:
[1] ICTR, Renzaho Trial Judgment 14 July 2009, para. 809 citing ICTY, Kunarac et al Appeals Judgment 12 June 2002, para. 164.
[2] ICTY, Aleksovski Appeals Judgment 24 March 2000, para. 28.
[3] SCSL, Sesay et al. Trial Judgment 2 March 2009, para. 177; ICTY, Kunarac et al. Trial Judgment 22 February 2001, para. 509-512, 514, 744; ICTY, Kunarac et al. Appeals Judgment 12 June 2002, para. 164-165.
