6.The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of sexual nature.

6.1.Causation by the perpetrator.

6.1.1.The perpetrator directly caused the person to engage in acts of a sexual nature.

6.1.2.The perpetrator placed victims in a situation where acts of a sexual nature would occur.

6.2.Engagement in acts of a sexual nature.

6.2.1.Evidence of the forms of engagement that the perpetrator caused.

6.3.Acts of a sexual nature.

6.3.1.The perpetrator caused acts of a sexual nature to occur.

6. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of sexual nature.

6.1.Ca usation by the perpetrator.

6.1.1. The perpetrator directly caused the person to engage in acts of a sexual nature.

6.1.2. The perpetrator placed victims in a situation where acts of a sexual nature would occur.

6.2. Engagement in acts of a sexual nature.

6.2.1. Evidence of the forms of engagement that the perpetrator caused.

6.3.Ac ts of a sexual nature.

6.3.1. The perpetrator caused acts of a sexual nature to occur.

ICTR

According to the Trial Chamber in Akayesu:

"The incident described by Witness KK in which the Accused ordered the Interahamwe to undress a student and force her to do gymnastics naked in the public courtyard of the bureau communal, in front of a crowd, constitutes sexual violence."[1]

SCSL

According to the Trial Chamber in Taylor:

"In addition to proving enslavement, the Prosecution must also prove that the Accused caused the enslaved person to engage in an act or acts of a sexual nature. The acts of sexual violence are the additional element that, when combined with evidence of slavery, constitutes sexual slavery."[2]

While the Appeals Chamber in Brima et al. held that:

"[N]o tribunal could reasonably have found that forced marriage was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery. While forced marriage shares certain elements with sexual slavery such as non-consensual sex and deprivation of liberty, there are also distinguishing factors. First, forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person by force or threat of force, through the words or conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with a another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the "husband" and "wife," which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. These distinctions imply that forced marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime. The Trial Chamber, therefore, erred in holding that the evidence of forced marriage is subsumed in the elements of sexual slavery."[3]

The Trial Chamber in Taylor referred to the Appeals Chamber's decision in Brima et al. when it held that:

"[I]n the absence of any specific charge relating to forced conjugal association, which was extensively testified to in this case, the elements of sexual slavery are satisfied, that is the deprivation of liberty and the imposition of non-consensual sex [...] With respect to the powers of ownership, the Trial Chamber notes that there is no differentiation between the forced sexual and non-sexual acts described, and the Appeals Chamber did not express the view that these acts did not constitute enslavement, but merely that they were not limited to sexual forms of slavery. The Trial Chamber is of the view that the conjugal slavery best describes these acts, and while they may constitute more than sexual slavery, they nevertheless satisfy the elements of sexual slavery. [...] The Trial Chamber considers that [...] conjugal slavery is not a new crime with additional elements. Rather it is a practice with certain additional and distinctive features that relate to the conjugal aspects of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, such as the claim by the perpetrator to a particular victim as his "wife" and the exercise of exclusive sexual control over her, barring others from sexual access to the victim, as well as the compulsion of the victim to perform domestic work such as cooking and cleaning. In the Trial Chamber's view, these are not new elements that require the conceptualization of a new crime."[4]